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1. Introduction 
20-3-1988 
The traditional cooperative enterprise whether in 
Yugoslavia or France, ItalY or Britain - presents three main 
distinctive features: 
iJ self-management: members have exclusive 
participation in decision-making, on equal terms [i.e. one 
man-one vote), directly or through representative organs. on 
all medium and long term issues such as labour organisation, 
employment ti.e. size of membership), income distribution, 
investment levels and finance; only day-to-day management is 
left to executives who simply implement these decisions. A 
circular structure of authority (from members upwards to 
representative organs and managers and downwards again on 
members as employees) replaces the hierarchical structure of 
the capitalist enterprise. Thus members have the decision-
making powers of entrepreneurs. 
ll) income-sharing: members participate in the 
distribution of net income (defined here as net value added 
less capital rentals and interest on loans I, also on equal 
terms except for the quantity and quality of labour services 
contributed by members. and their relative contribution (if 
any) to enterprise capital. Thus members draw an 
entrepreneurial income, i.e. a residual income after 
contractual fixed obligations have been met. Together, 
self-management and income-sharing give members the complete 
and exclusive role of entrepreneurs. 
iii) social capital: there are usually restrictions on 
the distribution of capital to members. at least for 
internally financed capital accumulation (which in 
Yugoslavia is discussed under the name of members' "past 
J. An earlier version of this paper was presented at 
the Seminar on Comparative Economic Systems at the EUI on 21 
January 1988. Acknowledgements are due to Tonv Atkinson. 
Alberta Chilosi, Edwin Morley-Fletcher, Milica Uvalic and 
especially to James Meade for useful comments. though they 
should not necessarily be associated with the views 
expressed here, or be held responsible for any remaining 
error or omission. 
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labour'', including investment in other enterprises; see 
Uvalic 1987)_ These are often accompanied by restrictions 
on the payment of interest on members' capital contributions 
when they exist_ These restrictions originate in the 
historical roots of cooperatives as mutual societies 
providing a service to members on more competitive terms 
than otherwise available: hence the implication that profit 
should not exceed the interest rate so that if, after 
members' capital contributions have obtained an interest, 
there is any internal capital accumulation it should be for 
the general benefit of future members or for the whole 
society_ The restrictions are also rooted in the works of 
early 19th century utopians, such as Robert Owen, Charles 
Fourier. Comte Henri de Saint-Simon and especially Philippe 
J_-8_ Buchez, a catholic Saint-Simonian who regarded a 
cooperative more like a monastic order than as an 
enterprise_~ In Yugoslavia these restrictions are 
reinforced by the obligation of the enterpris~ to maintain 
the capital initially conferred by the state at the time of 
changeover to the new system; initially state capital was 
subject to a rental-like tax. first eroded by inflation then 
abolished outright, however compensated since 1975 by an 
obligation to maintain also the real value of subsequent 
increments in net capital of the enterprise_ In capitalist 
countries the social connotations of cooperative enterprises 
lead also to restrictions on their activity (often limited 
to services to members) or the acceptability of the profit 
motive (excluded for instance by the Italian Constitution, 
art_ 45) _ These restrictions are usually compensated by 
lower tax rates than for traditional enterprises; this in 
turn discourages the development of more capitalist-like 
cooperatives even when they are allowed by legislation - a 
development usually opposed both by representatives of 
capitalist firms for fear of competition and by radicals 
committed to the social solidarity ideals of early 19th 
century utopians_ 
There are differences, of course, between different 
regimes, on issues such as: whether and on what scale non-
~- Charles Fourier intended to limit the profit share 
in value added to one third; Henri de Saint-Simon wished to. 
abolish profit altogether and opposed inheritance; Robert 
Owen's enterprise also limited profits; for an extensive 
survey and references see Landauer, 1956, Vol_ I, Ch-1, PP-
21-71_ Philippe Buchez (1831) envisaged a workers' 
cooperative reinvesting twenty per cent of net income, the 
resulting accumulation belonging not to members but to the 
cooperative, considered as "- __ indissoluble, not because 
individuals would not be able to detach themselves from it, 
but because this association would be made eternal through 
the continuous admission of new members_ Thus this capital 
would not belong to anybody, and would not be subject to 
inheritance laws"; this is precisely the dominant 
cooperative regime today; see the extensive introduction to 
Morley-Fletcher (1986) _ 
2 
member workers can be hired at a fixed wage; statutory 
limitations on the distribution of net income (more liberal 
in Ireland and Holland, for instance. than in other 
countries); extent of members' participation in the capital 
of cooperative enterprises (which is greatest in Mondragon 
cooperatives - see Thomas and Logan, 1982; Wiener and 
Oakshott, 1986 - and zero in Yugoslavia)_ However these 
general features, in one form or another, are typical and 
amount to what could be called a form of micro-socialism, 
not in a derogatory sense but simply to emphasize the 
presence at the microeconomic level of the standard 
socialist premises democratic planning, egalitarianism, 
social ownership of the means of production in an 
environment which otherwise could be indifferently 
capitalist, market socialist or centrally planned_ 
Cooperative enterprises, beside the non-conflictual 
implementation of widely shared social-democratic and almost 
philantropic values, are expected to provide self-help in 
the fight against unemployment, enhance downward flexibility 
of incomes and therefore facilitate adjustment to exogenous 
shocks, harness entrepreneurship, sharpen competition, 
improve labour relations, raise work satisfaction and 
productivity_3 The early and excessive claims of 
cooperative enthusiasts such as Charles Gide were sharply 
rebuked by Maffeo Pantaleoni (1898; encouraged by Vilfredo 
Pareto, see Morley-Fletcher, 1986, PP- LVI-LVII), who saw no 
difference between cooperative and conventional enterprises 
- a view which is now restricted to the comparison of long-
run equilibria-~ Modern economic analysis. on the contrary, 
while not denying the possibility of non-quantifiable major 
or minor gains from participation in income and decision-
making, has been quick to identify a considerable number of 
at least potential drawbacks, consisting in various forms of 
inefficiency and instability in the short and medium run_ 
Most propositions about the drawbacks of cooperatives are 
drawn from theoretical analysis. rather than direct 
)- An additional advantage is suggested by Jacques 
Dreze (1985), who expects cooperative enterprises also to 
provide their members by choosing an output-mix of 
contingent goods different from that of a capitalist firm -
with insurance against otherwise uninsurable tor only more 
expensively insurable) risks_ As an example we may think of 
cooperative farmers choosing, like sharecroppers do. a 
greater diversification of output than dictated by 
maximisation of average profits over the years. in order to 
reduce the downside risk of food scarcity otherwise 
resulting from greater specialisation, moreover in cash 
crops subject to price fluctuations_ However it is hard to 
think of other relevant examples, especially outside 
agriculture, that might make this an important and 
distinctive factor of cooperativ~ enterprise behaviour_ 
~- See Morley Fletcher, 1986_ 
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observation: indeed the cooperative enterprise is very much 
like the bumble-bee - in theory it should not be able to fly 
- but then bumble-bees are not the most successful examples 
of flying machines: there is a lot of room for improvement 
in th~ir design, as there is in that of cooperatives. 
This paper reviews the drawbacks of traditional 
cooper~tives, labelled after Benjamin Ward and Jaroslav 
Vanek for their pioneering work (section 2); illustrates 
James Meade's analysis of the alleged ultimate source of 
most of these drawbacks, namely the egalitarian foundations 
of cooperatives (section 3), and his proposals for an 
Inegalitarian Cooperative (section 4) and a Labour-Capital 
Discriminating Partnership (section 5) expected to eliminate 
the economic disadvantages of cooperatives. I will then 
criticise - apart from the unlikely rejection. by current 
and prospective cooperative members, of the long established 
principle of "same pay for the same work" - the suggest~d 
mode of operation of Meade's institutions and thelr 
suitability for realising their purposes (section 6) and 
propose an 
(section 7) . 
alternative solution to the same problems 
2. The alleged drawbacks of Ward-Vanek 
cooperative enterprises. 
In the last thirty years a vast literature 
(reviewed by Hill-McGrath-Reyes 1981, Pettman 1978 and 
Bartlett-Uvalic 1986) has discussed seven main alleged 
economic drawbacks of cooperative enterprises. These are: 
i) the unsuitability of cooperative enterprises 
outside labour-intensive sectors. This is due to worker-
members' lack of substantial own capital (otherwise they 
would not have to work) to invest or to be used as 
collateral against loans or rental contracts (for instance, 
see Meade, 1972) 
ii) the unsuitability of cooperative enterprises for 
risky ventures, for instance in sectors subject to sudden 
large fluctuations, in view of their inability - being tied 
to one or at most a couple of enterprises - to diversify 
risk (for instance, see Meade, 1972). These two factors 
reinforce each other: lack of capital makes cooperative 
workers particularly vulnerable to risk and therefore risk-
averse; this vulnerability makes potential lenders all the 
more unwilling to lend and keeps cooperatives out of 
capital-intensive sectors. These first two propositions 
correspond to uncontroversial direct observations: nobody 
expects oil tankers or steel mills to be operated by 
cooperatives. 
iii) in competitive conditions, restrictive 
unemployment policies on the part of any cooperative 
enterprise paying out incomes per member higher than the 
supply price of labour outside the cooperative. This is due 
to presumed maximisation of net distributable income per 
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member: thus employment will always be equal to or lower 
than that provided in the same conditions by a capitalist 
enterprise, since a cooperative enterprise can pay no less 
then that supply price or members would leave. but it can 
pay more, in which case it would operate at the (lower) 
level of employment that the capitalist firm would offer at 
an equivalent wage. This proposition is one of the set 
pieces of self-management literature ever since Benjamin 
Ward (1958) first drew the implications of cooperatives' 
self-centered behaviour. Implicitly this analysis rests on 
labour market clearing: if wage-earners are "rationed" in 
their ability to sell their labour at the going wage, 
cooperative enterprises might provide greater employment 
than their capitalist counterpart because of the greater 
downward flexibility of their members' incomes and their 
ability to operate in conditions where a capitalist 
enterprise would fail (See Meade, 1982). This qualification 
is demonstrated by employees threatened by plant closure 
often offering to keep the plant open by taking it over 
collectively; but if cooperative enterprises were only an 
instrument for enforcing labour income discipline in a 
recession they still could not claim general viability.~ 
The incentive to behave as predicted by Ward must be there, 
even if it is resisted or weakened or even overcompensated 
by other considerations. 
iv) in the case of monopoly, more restrictive 
monopolistic behaviour than in the case of capitalist firms, 
due to maximisation of monopoly profit per man instead of 
total profit. In fact, in the neighbourhood of maximum 
profit a small output fall would have no effect on profit 
but would reduce perceptibly labour inputs. thereby raising 
profit per man. This tendency makes cooperatives most 
unsuitable to operate public utilities. More generally 
cooperatives, while unable to exercise inflationary pressure 
through wage claims, would naturally exercise inflationary 
pressure directly on prices, so that they would have to be 
restrained by competition more than their capitalist 
counterpart (see Meade. 1982). Jaroslav Vanek thought this 
condition would be fulfilled given the smaller size expected 
of cooperatives, but there is no evidence of cooperatives 
b~ing significantly smaller than other firms in their sector 
of operation; indeed the contrary is true in Yugoslavia. 
where firms on average are larger than their counterparts in 
capitalist countries (see for instance Sacks 1983). 
v) inefficient allocation of labour in the short run. 
which rather overshadows the possibility of obtaining the 
same long term competitive equilibrium - mutatis mutandis -
as any market economy. This Paretian inefficiency is due to 
perverse response to changes in product price. technology 
and capital rental. In fact, for a cooperative in 
membership equilibrium: 
5 
IQ!~l_R~y~g~~-=-Ei~~g-~h~~g~~ 
Membership 
Marginal Revenue Product 
of Labour 
If the left hand side (average earnings) was lower than the 
right hand side it would pay to expand membership. while in 
the opposite case an increase in earnings would result from 
a smaller membership. Now, starting from this equilibrium 
position a product price rise. or an equivalent Hicks-
neutral rise in labour productivity (i.e. at the same rate 
regardless of the capital/labour ratio) or a decrease in 
capital rental all raise average net income per man 
relatively to its marginal product, because the fixed charge 
is not indexed to the price of the product. This provides 
an incentive to raise further average earnings per member 
through a reduction of membership size if at all possible, 
instead of encouraging greater employment and output in the 
short run, in response to the improved relative conditions 
of the sector in question; the opposite happens for product 
price falls and capital rental rise; either way, short-term 
adjustment leads to Paretian inefficiency. This is another 
set piece of Ward-Vanek analysis, illustrating the necessary 
implications of income-per-man maximisation in the one-
product one-input-other-than-labour case; Pareto-inefficient 
adjustment may but does not necessarily happen in the many-
products and/or many-inputs case (Vanek, 1970) but, even if 
then membership changes are in the right direction, they 
will be smaller than employment changes in an equivalent 
capitalist enterprise. 
Instability may ensue from this perverse adjustment 
process if the resulting downward sloping supply curve is 
less steep than the demand curve, demand increases raising 
prices and inducing a fall instead of a rise in supply (in 
which case the reverse would happen for demand falls). In 
any case any move towards a new equilibrium has to take 
place through the withdrawal or the birth of new 
enterprises, instead of through adjustments within existing 
enterprises. 
The macroeconomic implication of this drawback is the 
ineffective and inflationary nature of aggregate demand 
management in an economy dominated by cooperative 
enterprises. and its greater price fluctuations as a result 
of given fluctuations in monetary expenditure, though this 
is partly compensated by a greater resilience of full 
employment if it were to be reached; while a minority 
cooperative sector behaving anti-cyclically will function as 
automatic stabiliser. Another implication of short-run 
maximisation of income per man, neglected in the literature 
(except for Bartlett 1987, at least partly), is the failure 
of domestic currency devaluation as a policy instrument for 
improving the trade balance, and its inflationary impact, 
due to supply rigidities with respect to prices in the short 
run. 
vi) the 
due to bias 
rejection of 
inefficient use of capital in the medium run, 
in project selection, i.e. the possible 
investment projects having a positive present 
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value (at the supply price of labour) if they lower average 
earnings, and the possible acceptance of negative present 
value projects if they raise average earnings (Vanek, 1970) _ 
Positive value projects may be rejected if pre-investment 
income per member is greater than the supply price of 
labour. and the positive present value is obtained only for 
lower earning levels though no lower than the supply ~rice 
?f labour; this happens when an employment-expanding project 
1nvolves a membership increase proportionally greater than 
the associated increase in the present value of expected 
t?tal earnings. Conversely a negative present value project 
w1ll be attractive to a cooperative if it involves a 
membership decrease proportionally greater than the decrease 
it ca~ses in the present value of expected total earnings. 
The d1fference with respect to capitalist firms can be 
summarised thus (PV=present value of the project; 
L=membership; g=associated growth in the present value of 
expected total earnings): 
PV at the supply price of L >0 ·,(1 < 0 <0 
employment growth )g <g >g <g 
capitalist enterprise YES YES NO NO 
cooperative enterprise NO YES NO YES 
This involves a bias against the generation of new 
employment through investment in existing firms. contrary to 
what is expected of the growth of the cooperative sec~or. 
:he ~ost _attractive investment for a cooperative enterprise 
1s f1nanc1al. because it does not generate any employment at 
all; hence the built-in tendency, or at least temptation. 
for a co?perative to degenerate into a financial holding. 
Indeed. 1n the absence of other constraints. this 
degeneration process if unimpeded would lead eventually to a 
one-man financial holding: as income from financial assets 
replaces income from production further opportunities are 
created of raising net income per member through a reduction 
of membership parallel to the disinvestment in production 
activities. 
vii) even in the absence of such distortions in the 
selection of investment projects, a bias against the 
reinvestment of net income can be expected. since a 
cooperative member is entitled to the current benefits of a 
project only for the duration of his membership and does not 
participate in subsequent benefits or in the residual 
capital value of the investment (including its possible 
appreciation due to success greater than expected. or simply 
to inflation) at the time of his departure for whatever 
reason. 
Comparing the reinvestment of a unit of net income 
within the enterprise at an internal rate of return r or its 
distribution to members who can consume it or place it in 
saving deposits at a lending rate i, the cooperative member 
of expected tenure T. unless swayed by other considerations 
will be in equilibrium when 
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r (i + the percentage annuity obtainable from 
investing today the present value of a unit in T years); 
but then 
(i + such an annuity) > i, therefore r > i. 
If i is also the cost of credit finance to the cooperative, 
reinvestment will fall short of the optimum level 
corrisponding to its opportunity cost to members. Hence the 
occurrance of underinvestment out of self-finance to an 
extent governed by the age structure of members, undue 
preference for borrowed funds and the particular importance 
of financial intermediaries to avoid the possibility of 
underinvestment in the whole economy (see for instance 
Pejovic 1976 and Furobotn 1985). 
These contentions can be weakened, but seldom 
eliminated, by introducing further qualifications. The 
restrictive bias in membership recruitment may be offset by 
solidarity with the unemployed, pressure from local 
authorities or political interference. Perverse response to 
output price, technical progress and capital rental is 
constrained by the tenure of members and (as mentioned 
above) reduced by substitutability in both output mix and 
choice of inputs, though rigidities would still result. The 
birth of new cooperative enterprises competing structural 
profits away from existing ones, and labour redeployment 
through mergers (Nuti, 1986a) will reduce the short term 
inefficiency of the cooperative sector; anti-reinvestment 
bias will induce greater inter-firm mobility of funds, 
though the possibility of capital goods in turn being 
produced by cooperatives amplifies short term instability 
(Meade, 1982). Growth-mindedness will induce cooperative 
managers, like their capitalist counterparts, to push for 
reinvestment; concern for enterprise safety and employment 
prospects may induce members to support reinvestment in 
spite of shorter term benefits from paid out income. The 
possibility of borrowing on cheaper terms if there is own 
collateral and self-finance will induce at least some 
reinvestment; loans to firms are usually more expensive than 
the interest on households' saving deposits, narrowing or 
even reversing the gap between interest on individual 
savings and rate of return requested by members on self-
financed enterprise investment; but then the increase in the 
value of assets if investment is successful is not fully (if 
at all) distributable and cannot be included in the rate of 
return. 
While there is little or no empirical evidence of many 
of the alleged drawbacks occurring in practice, there can be 
no doubt that their danger, at least as a tendency 
admittedly partly or fully compensated or even possibly 
overcompensated for, has been well substantiated and cannot 
simply be dismissed (see for instance Horvat, 1986) 
appealing to the lack of sufficient incriminating evidence. 
One way of eliminating these drawbacks is Weitzman's 
proposal of income-sharing without self-management or job-
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security (and implicitly without the social restrictions on 
the distribution of capital and profits; Weitzman, 1983, 
1984, 1985a and b, 1986). Weitzman's claims and overclaims 
have been discussed elsewhere (see Nuti 1986b, 1987a, b and 
c) and will not be considered here. The other is Meade's 
proposals for introducing inequality among members in both 
decision-making and income-sharing. 
3. James Meade's diagnosis 
Meade (1972, section III) is intrigued by what causes 
the restrictive employment policy, monopolistic bias and 
perverse responses of cooperative enterprises. He suggests 
three main causes: 
i) the fact that in the cooperative the variable factor 
hires fixed factors, instead of the other way round as in 
the capitalist firm: this puts the burden of adjustment to 
change on medium-term capital accumulation instead of short-
term changes in labour employment; a cooperative of 
machines, as it were, could not adjust machine membership as 
easily and quickly as workers' membership can be changed, 
and would adjust the hiring of workers to work with ihem 
immediately, without perverse responses in the short run. 
ii) the fact that the cooperative maximand is not an 
absolute magnitude (profits, or their present value) but a 
ratio calculated per unit of input. A capitalist firm 
maximising the rate of profit per unit of capital employed, 
or an imaginary cooperative of machines maximising profit 
per machine would be as monopolistically restrictive as the 
workers' cooperative. However, the capitalist firm does not 
maximise the profit rate: it can be said to do so for a 
given capital, when it coincides with total profits 
maximization; but the capitalist firm does not (certainly 
should not) choose its investment so as to maximise its 
overall profit rate. Nor does the joint-stock company 
maximise profits per machine, as a hypothetical cooperative 
of machines; it maximises profits per share.6 In order to 
maximise profits per share not only labour is ~ired when its 
marginal revenue product exceeds the wage, but machines are 
bought or hired as long as they contribute a positive profit 
even if this lowers the average return per machine or the 
average profit rate on investment in machines. The joint-
stock company is inegualitarian - Meade argues - because 
"while all shareholders are treated equally, not all 
shareholders "own," as it were, the same number of machines 
per £100 suscribed in money capital" (1072. p. 420). This 
§. The essential significance of this difference 
apparently struck James Meade while he was lying sleeplessly 
in bed one evening in India, just in time to correct the 
next morning an assertion to the contrary he had made the 
previous day at a seminar at the Delhi School of Economics; 
see Meade 1972, p. 418, footnote. 
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observation leads Meade to the ultimate cause of the 
peculiar expected behaviour of cooperatives, i.e. 
iii) income equality among cooperative workers, with 
newcomers being given a share equal to that of older 
members, as opposed to the inequality of profits per machine 
in the joint stock company when a decision is taken to hire 
or buy a new machine. Also, in the joint-stock company 
there is inequality between the profit share earned per unit 
of financial investment by older shareholders with respect 
to the terms offered to new shareholders brought in to 
finance investment in machines which earn a lower rate of 
profit than machines already installed. Ultimately, Meade 
argues, what saves the joint stock company from the kind of 
problems arising in a cooperative enterprise is inequality 
between machines, and the parallel inequality between profit 
shares per unit of investment enjoyed by different 
shareholders according to the success of the venture at the 
time of their joining. 
This diagnosis leads to a natural cure: the 
introduction of a similar inequality in the cooperative 
enterprise. Two kinds of new institutions are thus 
generated: the Inegalitarian Cooperative (Meade, 1972) and, 
more generally, the Labour-Capital Discriminating 
Partnership (Meade, 1982 Ch.IX and Appendix E, 1986a. 
1986bJ. 
4. The Inegalitarian Cooperative 
James Meade proposes a labour partnership differing 
from the traditional cooperative in the inequality of 
members depending on the conditions prevailing at the time 
of their joining the cooperative. Founders presumably 
stipulate equal shares, but new members are hired at an 
income equal not to current average earnings per member but 
to the value of labour marginal revenue product, i.e. new 
members are given a number of "shares" such as to guarantee 
that level of current income, and are exposed to its 
fluctuations per share for the rest of their membership. 
The object of the cooperative now becomes the 
maximisation of income per share. At the cost of income 
inequality between members, and the inequality of voting 
power involved in unequal shares, most of the drawbacks of 
cooperatives are eliminated. Namely, drawbacks i) ii) and 
vii), i.e. unsuitability for capital-intensive and risky 
ventures and reinvestment aversion, remain, while 
iii) Restrictive employment policies end; any worker 
whose supply price is no higher than the marginal revenue 
product of labour will be offered employment; the system 
produces the kind of labour income flexibility that to 
mainstream economic literature is a precondition of full (or 
fuller) employment; 
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iv) The over-monopolistic bias of cooperatives ends, 
again because total earnings of existing members are 
maximised, not earnings per man seeing that-new men do not 
get more than their contribution to additional monopoly 
profits; 
v) When a rise in product price lifts average earnings 
more than labour marginal revenue product, the partnership 
will recruit new members instead of seeking to reduce its 
size - at an income lower than that of existing members but 
higher than offered before the price rise: henc; no perverse 
or rigid response ensues. The same will happen with 
technological change, or rental change. There will be none 
of the macroeconomic implications of ~erverse responses: nor 
any need to rely exclusively on the birth of new firms to 
move towards equilibrium. 
vi) There will be no labour-saving bias in the 
selection of investment projects, since lo~er than average 
earnings can be offered not just for the current period but 
for the rest of new members' working life within the unequal 
partnership (though Meade has never shown awareness of ihis 
kind of problem arising, asserting instead the equal 
attraction of credit-financed investment even in the 
traditional cooperative enterprise).z 
Meade advocates provisions for workers leaving the 
partnership: they may be bribed to leave voluntaril~ with 
the benefit of all parties, if their marginal revenue 
product becomes lower than their average earnings ras would 
result from a product price increase); they may also, 
however, have to compensate those who remai~. if their 
departure leads to a fall in average earnings per member and 
j~opardizes the cooperative's atilitv to repay loans or pay 
f1xed charges. This penalty on departure goes both against 
the notion of limited liability, presumably not ruled out by 
cooperative membership, and against the basic freedom of 
labour mobility that since the advent of capitalism workers 
have always enjoyed. There seems to be no need for members 
to take on more personal responsibility for their 
cooperative's loans than is the case for joint-stock holders 
and, in any case. this can be stipulated at the time loans 
are taken. Unless members at the time of joining have 
specifically taken on personal responsibility for the 
cooperative's liabilities the cooperative, if one member's 
departure makes the cooperative insolvent and he cannot be 
replaced, simply will have to go into liquidation. 
2- See for instance Meade 1982 p.217: "The purchase of 
a new machine by a cooperative should be to the advantages 
of all the members if the discounted cash flow from the 
machine (using the rate of interest at which it could borrow 
funds) were greater than the cost of the machine''. As we 
have seen above (section 2 point iv) a positive present 
value at the supply price of labour is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for cooperative investment. 
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The further removal of the remaining drawbacks can be 
obtained bv what Meade calls the Labour-Capital 
Discriminating Partnership (already outlined in the 1972 
article and developed in subsequent work), which generalises 
the system to members contributing capital, including the 
recognition of capital contributions of member-workers in 
the form of self-financed investment (Meade 1982 Appendix E 
and 1986a, later abandoned in Meade 1986b). 
5. The Labour-Capital Discriminating Partnership 
A process of instant transition from traditional 
capitalist firms to Labour-Capital Discriminating 
Partnerships is described thus (Meade 1986b, section 7). 
Each factor is offered, instead of the income which it would 
get under current arrangements, a number of shares such that 
the same income level is obtained under the guise of 
dividends out of the firm's net income. Two types of share 
certificates are envisaged, namely capital shares to those 
who would have received profit, rent, interest (i.e. a kind 
of "debt for equity swap"), and labour shares distributed to 
employees, pro-rata so as to exhaust all of the enterprise 
revenue (after-tax net value added). All shares carry an 
entitlement to the same kind and amount of dividend. There 
would be no immediate effect on income, but subsequently all 
- including former recipients of contractual income - would 
participate in the success or failure of the enterprises. 
However capital shares would be like ordinary shares, freely 
tradable on the stock exchange or elsewhere, while labour 
share certificates would be tied to the individual employee 
and surrendered and cancelled at retirement or voluntary 
departure. Labour shares would be retained by redundant 
workers until they find suitable alternative occupation as 
long as they remained available for work, a provision 
guaranteeing income if not employment. The scheme therefore 
differs radically from ESOPs, or Employee Share Ownership 
Plans, where typically part of employee earnings are paid 
into a trust fund used to buy the company's shares and to 
hold them either to pay cash benefits to all employees 
thereafter or to distribute them to employees after a period 
of time or on retirement (see Meade 1986a, p. 116-7). 
The employment of new workers or additional capital 
would be covered by additional issues of the appropriate 
share certificates, which would only be agreed upon by 
current shareholders if it added something to dividends per 
share. The problem would still arise of the riskiness of 
labour share certificates, but risk-averse workers could 
reduce this by settling for part of their income to be 
contractually fixed, as for other current inputs. 
The usual reinvestment aversion would be avoided by 
issuing either free debentures (Meade, 1982) or free capital 
shares corresponding to self-financed investment, pro-rata 
to all labour and capital shareholders (Meade 1986a, or at 
least to capital shareholders while labour shareholders get 
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their share of profits in cash, as in Meade 1986b). 
Debentures would also have to be issued to members in lieu 
of dividends for the part of income consisting of capital 
gains, if these were included (as in theory they should beJ 
in the definition of income; but then capital losses would 
also have to be taken into account and offset against 
dividends. A competitive periodic revaluation of capital 
(such as that proposed by Nuti, 1988a, for a socialist 
economy lacking developed financial markets, especially 
secondary markets) would be helpful in trying to calculate 
profits correctly by adding the change in net capital assets 
to distributable income; though Meade at most regards real 
capital gains as part of distributable profits (1986b), this 
indexation of capital shares giving them a questionable 
extra protection not enjoyed by labour shares. 
In the Discriminating Partnership capitalists could 
contribute risk capital in the amounts required by the 
capital intensity of output, seeing that they would have a 
voice in the management of assets; they would also lend more 
readily than to ordinary cooperatives. All the residual 
problems of traditional cooperatives left open by the 
Inegalitarian Cooperative would be disposed of and none of 
the other problems would reappear. 
There would be a few minor new problems. Meade 
envisages the possibility that, in case of losses, labour-
shareholders may have to pay a net amount before they can 
leave, if the burden of losses on retiring workers exceeds 
what they are owed by the enterprise on other grounds; apart 
from the objections raised above for the Inegalitarian 
Cooperative, we can observe that if this case occurs the net 
assets of the partnership must be negative and. therefore. 
it must go into liquidation rather than rely on retiring 
workers to pay off their share of net liabilities. 
Workers might deliberately work badly to make 
themselves redundant, or genuinely redundant workers may 
claim that they cannot find a comparable occupation; 
provisions stipulating continued availability to refill the 
same post should take care of this. There would be a 
remaining conflict at the time of switchover to the new 
system, to freeze the shares at a given level. but this 
would "involve a once-for-all conflict" (1986b. p. 48). 
Another conflict may arise over enterprise liquidation being 
variously attractive to capital and labour shareholders; 
compensation to workers may have to be paid, unless they 
have been given capital shares for their past participation 
in self-financed investment. Investment in social amenities 
may remain controversial, but their provision would probably 
raise productivity and the conflict is probably neither 
sharp nor large. Promotions of deserving workers through 
higher fixed payments or new share issues also may be a bone 
of contention, but Meade expects consensus to arise from the 
overall benefits obtainable from such promotions. The 
intermittence, variability and unpredictability of workerE 
dividends could be dealt with by frequent fixed payments 
subject to yearly adjustments (as in Yugoslav weekly or 
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monthly advance or akontacja). through some kind of dividend 
equalisation fund. 
Meade is untypically sanguine about systemic gains from 
the new institution: "If ... there was a substantial shift 
from fixed wage to partnership shares, the advantages of the 
new organisation could be very substantial. Many basic 
conflicts of interest between labour and capital in reaching 
decisions about employment and investment would be resolved. 
Decisions to expand employment so long as there were 
available unemployed workers would not be impeded by the 
need to negotiate a reduction of pay for existing workers" 
(1986b, p.42). Some residual conflict over self-financed 
accumulation might remain, over indexed capital shares or 
the possible payment of dividends to workers in the form of 
securities,§ but the progress would be undeniable. 
The purpose of the scheme is not that of " ... promoting 
a property-owning democracy" but to make "workers become 
risk-bearers together with the entrepreneur capitalists" -
if they wish (1986b, pp. 54-55); in order to induce them to 
accept risk, tenure is attached to labour employment. "Any 
reduction in demand for the product of the industry would be 
met not, as in a Capitalist Wage Economy, by a reduction in 
employment and growth of unemployment but by a reduction in 
prices and in the dividends payable to all workers and 
capitalists'' (ibidem, pp. 42-43). This is Weitzman's ideal 
of flexible incomes and stable employment, without his 
overclaims and without taking away from workers their voice 
in enterprise management or job security. Like Weitzman, 
Meade invokes externalities to justify initial government 
subsidisation of the proposed institution: the necessity of 
its introduction on a large scale to stabilise employment 
and reduce individual risk, the need to encourage firms 
which have a large share of intermediate inputs in the value 
of output; and the diffusion of the burden of adjustment 
through income flexibility over a large number of firms 
(ibidem, pp. 56-57). If the promises of this institutional 
engineering could be fulfilled, the scheme would certainly 
be worthy of public support, especially as part of the 
package including also a socially guaranteed minimum income 
financed out of state capital, put forward by James Meade in 
his project for the "Partnership Economy" (1988). 
6. Viability and effectiveness of the proposed 
institutions 
There is a simple - though no less insurmountable for 
that - criticism to Meade's construct, namely that workers 
are unlikely to reject the long established principle of 
"same pay for the same work".2 While Meade himself readily 
2- This is the issue, rather than inequality .as such. 
In fact here with respect to the traditional cooperative 
system there is greater inequality within the enterprise, 
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formulates and accepts this criticism, when new institutions 
are proposed their clash with established customs and ways 
of thinking cannot be regarded as a final objection if these 
institutions can offer tangible net improvements in other 
ways. Such improvements may be partly offset by the adverse 
effects, on productivity and labour peace, of a system 
perceived to provide "unequal pay for equal work". whereas 
the separation of labour pay and dividends makes inequality 
of income more acceptable if it derives from the number of 
shares held and associated claim to profits. However this 
objection is simply a way of putting a price tag onto those 
old ways and customs, and asking whether they are worth 
preserving at that price. Hence it is a subjective ground 
for criticism. not a final argument against the proposed 
innovation. Effective criticism requires arguments against 
either the suggested mode of operation of the pr;posed 
institutional innovations, or their suitability for their 
purposes. 
Meade's fundamental propositions about the inequality 
of joint-stock holders and the machines/workers analogy 
neglect that the real difference between cooperative worke~s 
and either machines or joint-stock holders is the time 
horizon encompassed by contracts. 
Machines are bought or hired on prefixed terms over a 
long period of time - a difference in practice close to that 
between fixed and variable factors but not identical to that 
distinction, for variable factors other than labour can be 
acquired on a long term (future or forward) contract, while 
labour cannot. The capital contribution of initial 
stockholders is forever (or until liquidation) incorporated 
in their shares; initial shareholders can recover some of 
their capital. or even more than they have put in. by 
selling their share if they find a buyer who takes their 
place on the same terms; if there is no buyer shareholders 
have to keep their shares or can just throw them away. 
Workers are seldom offered long-term contracts and never 
have to fulfill them; they cannot be incorporated in shares 
in the same way as capital because this would imply an 
obligation - for them and their successors forever or until 
liquidation - to work as well as a right to a dividend, and 
they could only get out by paying a substitute to take their 
place. Yet in order to construct cooperatives really 
equivalent to a mirror-image of joint-stock companies, 
workers would have to enter a contract of precisely that 
kind, while capital was provided only on short term loans at 
a spot interest and fixed capital on short term leases. both 
b~t--p;tenti~1-ineq~~1ity-bet~een-~o;per~ti~e-enterprises-is 
probably reduced by greater mobility of labour across 
enterprises; in any case it does not necessarily follow that 
that there will be more inequality, however measured. in 
the Discriminating Partnerships economy, where there may be 
more sources of inequality but not necessarily more unequal 
distribution of income. · 
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funds and fixed assets remaining liquid and free to leave at 
any time though possibly with the option to stay at prefixed 
conditions. 
The implausibility of this costruct should highlight 
the true and inescapable difference between the position of 
capital and labour whether in joint-stock companies or in 
discriminating partnerships. Once the feudal-like 
compulsion to supply serf-labour is removed from it, 
however, we could have workers supplying their own labour 
without the risk of having to work against their wish (like 
privileged shareholders not risking their capital), able to 
transfer their job i.e. their membership and the 
associated obligation to work - at a price to others. This 
institutional set up has been investigated by Schlicht and 
Weiszacker (1977) precisely in this context, i.e. in a 
search for viable risk-financing provisions in labour-
managed enterprises. Jobs in this set-up are bought by 
workers from other workers or from expanding firms; "These 
tradable job rights are the precise analogue of tradeable 
shares in a capitalist environment" (Schlicht and Weiszacker 
1977, p. 60). This system may be unpalatable or at any rate 
unrealistic as a possible arrangement for industrial labour 
in large scale production. but is not all that absurd: it 
is, after all. the system prevailing in professional 
partnerships, and even in conventional cooperatives 
sometimes there is a de facto. if not de jure. ability to 
nominate a successor or to transfer one's job to a relative. 
I 
Schlicht and Weiszacker presume that "Holders of these 
job rights will make decisions in accordance with the long 
run interest of the firm, because they want to maximise the 
present market value of their tradable job rights'' (1977. 
p.60). This is not so; here the two authors make precisely 
the kind of mistake carefully avoided by James Meade: 
maximisation of return per job, i.e. per physical unit of 
input, is not the same as profit (or present value) 
maximisation (see above, section 3). The value of a job 
right must be equal to the present value of expected job 
differentials over time, with respect to the supply price of 
labour at the same times; this is maximised by maximising 
net income per man, which takes us back to the Ward-Vanek 
problems, except for the anti-reinvestment bias 
(investigated in section 2.vii) which here disappears due 
to members' time horizon becoming virtually infinite. 
Beside throwing light on the ultimate differences 
between cooperatives and traditional enterprises the short 
run nature of workers' necessary association with 
enterprises of whatever kind has three destructive 
implications for Meade's Labour-Capital Discriminating 
Partnerships. As workers can freely leave, the continued 
existence of these Partnerships requires that worker-
members' income should continuously match their outside 
opportunities. 
Meade only looks at the 
before and after a new member 
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short period. immediately 
is hired; he neglects what 
happens in a sequence of such moves, apart from the 
necessity to revise periodically the share of old members in 
order to promote - if it is in the interest of all - those 
who deserve it. But when a partnership made up of 
individuals each with a possibly different number of shares 
giving claim to current enterprise income continuously 
negotiates with newcomers presumably each member will also 
reconsider his own position and how his number of shares 
compares with that which would give him his opportunity 
earnings outside the partnership. Also, these earnings will 
be varying over time and with the position of newcomers; 
while newcomers will take into account not just their 
current income deriving from the shares attributed to them 
but also the implications of such remuneration scheme for 
their future earnings. In practice newcomers benefit 
proportionally to their number of shares - from improvements 
in labour average productivity relatively to the initial 
position; but no newcomer can be offered better terms than 
any of the existing members (who otherwise could leave and 
turn themselves into new members). Thus anybody hired in 
the boom at a lower share than the others will have to be 
given more shares in the recession. therefore shortening the 
distance from the other members. No existing member c~n be 
given less than his opportunity earnings o; he will leave 
the partnership. It follows that 
i) at any time the size of 
directly related to the length 
Meadean system would not be all 
economy with employment security 
bonuses, with some profit-sharing 
a member's share is always 
of his membership; the 
that different from a wage 
and substantial seniority 
and some eo-determination. 
ii) current members, knowing that the number of shares 
of newly hired members is not really fixed but can vary only 
upwards. will be naturally reluctant to hire new members 
even if their marginal revenue product is higher than their 
dividend on the initial number of shares issued to hire 
them. Thus there would continue to be a restrictive bias of 
the same kind as that of the Ward-Vanek cooperative. 
iii) Because of continuous renegotiations with 
newcomers, there would be permanent conflict instead of the 
abolition of conflict. The system amounts to marginal-
product spot-pricing of labour services at the margin~ i.e. 
exclusively for newcomers (and members considered for 
promotion). while average product affects inframarginal 
pricing of the labour of existing members, except for 
possible successful renegotiations on the part of the less 
favoured among existing members. But the very possibility 
of renegotiating one's share at any time, or at least when 
promotions or new members are considered, would lead to a 
permanent state of strife. Strikes, for instance, would ne· 
more be prevented by the involved loss of income than they 
are in a conventional wage economy by the loss of the 
strikers' wage. Would strikers instantaneously lose their 
job? If not, there is no built-in constraint to a Meadean 
Partnership's ability to water its capital, i.e. to dilute 
the amount of capital underlying each share through the 
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issue of any number of additional shares under the recurring 
threat of this group or another within the firm - it being 
in the interest of all that the threat of temporary 
withdrawal bv a particular group of workers should be 
removed by the granting of new shares up to the amount of 
potential loss they can inflict. A conventional joint-stock 
company has a monetary budget constraint, and at some point 
has to resist concessions to groups of workers under the 
demonstrable threat of insolvency and bankrupcy; the Meadean 
Partnership is not constrained by the number of shares it 
can issue. and permanent share-inflationary conflicts are 
bound to afflict and disrupt the Meadean economy. If 
strikers were made to lose their membership and job. this 
would be a rather drastic and possibly counterproductive way 
of ending conflict; in any case the possibility of working 
to rule or witholding effort creates a sufficient threat for 
conflict to occasionally or frequently reappear. unbounded 
by budget constraints. 
7. An alternative solution 
On these counts. the Labour-Capital Discriminating 
Partnership is bound to disappoint. Yet James Meade's 
analysis provides two valuable contributions: first, the 
disregard of the microsocialist commitment of the more 
traditional cooperative enterprises though he takes 
inequalitv too far. to include "unequal income for equal 
work"; second, the idea of issuing bonds or capital shares 
also to workers in recognition of their contribution to 
self-finance (which here we understand in the broadest sense 
of any contribution to the increase in value of the 
partnership capital assets, whether due to reinvestment, 
inflation or improvement of profit pro~pects). If one 
retains this kind of share and bonds issue. adding a 
modified distribution of capital and labour shares, and 
furthermore a suitably modified version of tradable job 
rights. an alternative solution can be constructed with all 
the advantages and none of the drawbacks of the 
Discriminating Partnership. 
Micro-socialism within the traditional cooperative 
enterprise takes the form of internal equality of income, 
equality of access to capital and to its fruits. democratic 
planning. self-management; but what is the point if the 
outside environment - whether in Yugoslavia or in capitalist 
economies - is one where there is wage labour. inequality of 
incomes (especially the inter-cooperative gross inequality 
caused by the very principles of cooperative income 
sharing)JQ. inequality of capital ownership and access to 
--------------------10. That labour income differentials are blatantly 
large-~cross Yugoslav cooperatives, in different sectors and 
regions as well as in the same sector and region, is well 
documented (see Estrin 1979, Rivera-Batiz 1980, Staellerts 
1984). An international comparison by Estrin (1981) shows 
that income dispersion in Yugoslavia was higher than in 
other countries and it was higher during the period of 
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capital, unearned as well as earned income, and lack of 
participation not least on the part of unemployed or 
emigrated workers? Let us take, from Meade's Discriminating 
Partnership, the idea of inequality of individual shares and 
incomes, retaining however equality for type of individual 
income, Thus let the number of labour shares corresponding 
to one job be the same for all workers, except for 
differences due to the type of labour (according to a job 
valuation system as highly developed as in Yugoslavia) and 
for a different mixture of fixed and participaiorv elements 
in workers' incomes. Thus workers could choose. at the time 
of joining, how many hours of their working week should be 
paid at the going (spot) wage rate and how m~ny hours should 
be paid through profit-sharing; they would be given a number 
of shares equal to the same fraction oi the shares 
corresponding to a totally participatory job. Wage workers 
could be hired and would have no shares. In recognition of ~ 
wage-workers' exposure to entrepreneurial risks - even in 
the absence of profit-sharing in their income - through the 
non-diversified commitment of all of their labour se~vices 
to a single enterprise, both member-workers and non-member 
workers might be given an equal vote on every question 
except the reinvestment of income, on which members would 
have an exclusive voice. 
Let us then retain Meade's provision for the issue of 
bonds and shares to all shareholders, including workers pro-
rata of the number of labour shares held. in recognition of 
self-financed investment and capital gains !conversely, 
shareholders would be exposed to capital losses, though 
presumably only to the extent of their pa~ticipatory 
income). 
Now, let job rights (and attached work obligations! be 
transferable to outsiders, who could buy them fr;m existing 
workers or from the enterprise. If hiring a new man. 
issuing to him the same number of labour shares owned by 
those already employed, lowered net income per head of the 
employed, that job can be sold at a positive price. and 
those already employed would lose nothing since they would 
get additional capital shares (like all other shareholders. 
perhaps not instantaneously but once a sufficient number of 
small adjustments like this have taken place so as to make 
an additional share issue worthwhile) to compensate exactly 
;~~k;t--;;1r:;~n~g;;;nt--th~n--d~~ing--th;--planned--pe~i~d~ 
There have been debates on whether t~is dispersion is due to 
the lottery of unequal access to capital per man in 
different enterprises and sectors (as maintained by the so-
called "capital school", see Estrin and Bartlett. 1982}. or 
to the failure to adjust membership to external shock~ in 
the short period (the "labour school"). These debates have 
been inconclusive but the cause of dispersion is immaterial: 
the very fact of income inequality across enterprises 
undermines inexorably the case for equality within the 
enterprise. 
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the drop in dividends per labour share following employment 
expansion. 
However, there is implicit inequality in a system in 
which people have to pay for jobs, and different amounts at 
that; also, it may be difficult for everybody involved to 
agree on the correct valuation of job rights. But suppose 
each enterprise is given an obligation to hire more peop~e 
as long as its jobs are demanded at a positive price. Th1s 
should ensure, at the same time, that anybody wh~ ea~ ma~e a 
net positive contribution to the enterprise pr~f1ts 1s h1red 
and that all existing shareholders benef1t from_ that 
positive net contribution through their part~cipat~on 1n the 
enterprise capital value increase. Thus JOb r1ghts ~re 
tradeable only to have an automatic check on the enterpr1se 
employment policy, but should never be so va~uable as ~o 
generate active trade. Of course the ente~pr1se can avo1d 
being forced to hire more labour by cream1ng off current 
profits to current shareholders lincluding labour 
shareholders) by issuing them additional capital shares, 
while lowering the dividend per share to the point that 
makes its jobs worthless to transfer. Thus the scheme 
proposed here has nothing to do Hith Hertzka's (1~91) "~ree 
access" of workers to the enterprise of their cho1ce, _s1nce 
additional workers can join the enterprise only at an_1nco~e 
lower than the previous average income per worker (1.e. 1n 
accordance with Meade's discrimination principle, but 
without violating at any given time the principle of equal 
pay for equal work). 
This alternative scheme corresponds to wage labour plus 
workers' participation in a fixed share of profits, paid out 
as capital shares. In addition, however, workers also get 
dividends on their capital shares, of which each worker 
holds a different amount according to seniority, thrift and 
enterprise performance. This differs from E~OPs because 
these shares are paid out at fairly frequent 1ntervals a~d 
are immediately available to workers, who can declare the1r 
own dividends by selling them if they need cash, instead of 
having to wait until departure or retirem~nt, ~r_having to 
surrender their capital rights and only enJOY d1v1dends for 
the duration of their employment with that particular 
enterprise. It should be noticed that the issue of ~apital 
shares lor bonds) to absorb all profits (broadly def1ne~ as 
any income net of contractual payments -including _flxed 
wage components - including as income also any change 1n the 
value of enterprise assets) may be difficult to measure but 
any measurement error will affect uniquely distribution of 
net assets between shareholders according to the time of the 
assessment, but not the viability of the enterprise vis-a-
vis third parties, nor the distribution between workers qua 
workers and capitalists. 
The result of this exercise in consistency is that if 
we want labour to share fully or to a prefixed degree in 
enterprise risk, this can be done without violating "equal 
pay for equal work" in a strict sense, since here all 
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workers get the same fixed wage per unit of time for the 
portion of their pay consisting of a wage, and the same 
dividend for labour share for the portion of their pay 
consisting of participatory income. At the same time, this 
system allows for different labour income due to different 
combinations of fixed and participatory elements, 
predetermined in individual contracts; it also allows for 
different income per worker (i.e. including income on his 
capital shares and bonds distributed to him as labour 
shareholder plus or minus his subsequent investment or 
disinvestment), reflecting fairly and fully the past history 
of the enterprise, the full contribution that the his "past 
labour" has made to capital formation in the enterprise for 
the precise duration of the worker's association with that 
enterprise, and his own thrift. 
In a Yugoslav-type system the proposed combination of 
job tradeability (only to ensure a zero price) and 
shares/bonds issues against capital increases, revolutionary 
as it might seem, would not be as much a departure from the 
Yugoslav system as the Meadean Discriminating Partnership. 
In the absence of a secondary market where capital shares 
might be traded, issues to workers would have to consist of 
bonds - as an adjustable recognition of "past labour". 
There would be no shareholders, but somehow one would have 
to take into account the "original" or "primitive" 
accumulation of the Yugoslav enterprise, i.e. the initial 
contribution by the state at the time of changeover to the 
new system or at the time of foundation of the cooperative 
enterprise. Suppose enterprise capital could always be 
overbid out of its hands by other enterprises unless actual 
rentals (of capital goods received from the state) or 
imputed rentals (on own capital) are raised to the highest 
level offered by outside bidders, la' la Liska, 1963; see 
also Barsony, 1982); with higher imputed rentals added to 
distributable income, all income being distributed either in 
cash or in bonds. This arrangement would suit all: the 
state, whose initial contribution would be continuously 
revalued and recognised; workers collectives, who could 
still retain the profit of any above-marginal effort or 
ability they might apply to the capital goods in their use, 
as well as benefitting from a higher market valuation of 
their own assets if they are forced to surrender them; 
individual workers who would benefit from any reinvestment 
or revaluation of their "past labour", with equality in 
labour incomes tempered by inequality of capital incomes 
however justified by the acquisition of bonds under uniform 
rules. Anybody leaving the enterprise would be clutching 
bonds corresponding to that part of enterprise capital 
financed by his efforts or revalued by the rentals market 
during his association with the enterprise since he joined, 
and would not lose by leaving anything behind. None of the 
drawbacks lamented would remain. 
If capital shares were issued in a Yugoslav-like system 
there may be methods of valuing enterprise assets and 
therefore the capital value underlying a share even in the 
absence of a developed capital market. At first, capital 
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shares may be made tradable among members of the 
cooperative; it may be stipulated at foundation that any 
member can offer his shares for sale to the other members 
according to the following rules. If the shares are not 
taken up at that price, he is entitled to buy up to the same 
amount of shares from the other shareholders at that price; 
viceversa, he can offer to buy shares up to the amount he 
already owns at a given price, but if his offer is not taken 
up the other shareholders if he wishes must buy off him at 
that price, pro-rata up to the amount initially demanded. 
his own shares. This provi~ion generates a kind of forced 
liquidity of capital-shares. Alternatively, a competitive 
rental or price determination under the scheme outlined in 
the previous paragraph may provide the foundation of a 
~eriodic valuation. 
Thus the Alternative Cooperative proposed here - with 
minor modifications for Yugoslav-type systemic constraints -
is simply an association of members conferring labour 
services and/or capital, without limitations as to the 
nature and purpose of its activity, ability to hire the 
labour of non-members on a eo-determination but not 
necessarily profit-sharing basis, the recognition of capital 
contributions by members at the time of foundation and/or 
through reinvestment of profits (including any appreciation 
of enterprise assets). the ability to distribute profits 
proportionally to capital and - according to a conversion 
rate fixed at foundation labour membership. the 
liquidation of the cooperative and distribution of capital 
among its members. Worker-members' shares are made as 
permanent (thereby protecting tenure) and transferable as 
those of capital-members, but with a built-in safeguard in 
order to avoid restrictive employment policies and to make 
the position of each worker as close as possible to that of 
a wage-earner in the direct return to his labour, while 
enriching him through the issue of bonds or shares to 
reflect the success of his enterprise for the duration of 
his employment. 
None of the lamented inefficiencies discussed above 
(section 2) for the traditional Ward-Vanek cooperative would 
derive from the proposed arrangements: capital membership 
could be offered on terms sufficient to attract funds to 
capital-intensive as well as labour intensive activities; 
wage labour and the free issue of job rights should get rid 
of temptations to restrict employment, behave over-
monopolistically, respond perversely to change; the same 
investment projects would pass a viability test as in the 
capitalist firm. reinvestment of income would not be 
penalised. At the same time, worker-members would have not 
only tenure but transferrable rights to the fruits - if they 
are there of successful entrepreneurship; workers' 
participation in decision making would be as wide as 
compatible with these provisions, vastly greater than in the 
conventional firm, as well as enhanced by the prospect of a 
permanent connection and the possibility of continuing to 
participate even after the cessation of the work 
relationship. 
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After removing the social constraints which, in the 
present _ day cooperative everywhere, affect usually 
me~bersh1p, use and recoverability of capital, a case could 
st1ll be made for the maintenance of the favourable fiscal 
tre~tme~t presently enjoyed by cooperatives with respect to 
cap1tal1st enterprises. for three reasons: 
i) greater risk: for dividends to worker-members and 
to wage-earners. the indivisibility of risk for labour as 
oppos~d_to the poss~bility of risk-spreading for capital; 
for d1v1dends to cap1tal-members the greater risk associated 
to the reduced voice that capital has in cooperatives 
compared to joint-stock companies. 
ii) for dividends to worker-members. a favourable 
fiscal ~reatment is justified by their representing "earned" 
labou~ 1ncome which is or should be treated le;s harshly 
than un:=arned" income because it involves a loss of leisur~ 
not requ1red b~ "unearned" income; for dividends to capital-
m:=m~ers a res1dual commitment to solidarity beyond the 
l1m1ts of current membership would have to be maintained. 
devoting a statutory part of enterprise profits and/or 
capital at liquidation to social purposes. (such as an 
Investment Fund for setting up new cooperative enterprises. 
see Nuti, 1988b) _ 
iii) f~nally, there is a Proudhonian argument in favour 
of encourag1ng associated producers working for each other 
~nstead of working for a master. especially if wage-labour 
lS on a small scale and has the option of eventually gaining 
full membership, and if the cooperative has extensive links 
with other cooperatives. Without going back to Proudhon 
:he "mut~al help" commitment of the early days of th~ 
~oop~rat1ve movement could be regarded as satisfied by the 
pers1stent_adopt~on _of less conflictual strategies than can 
be ~ound 1n cap1tal1st firms and by the less conflictual 
env1ronment that would be generated as a result. 
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